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T IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR SCHOLARS TO BE SO MESMERIZED by a model that they fail to see that their own data demonstrate its inadequacy. In the decades following the publication of The Nuer and African Political Systems in 1940, countless anthropologists "discovered" segmentary lineage systems in various societies where they did not exist.' One such ethnographer was David Hart, who did fieldwork in the Rif highlands of northern Morocco from 1952 through 1955 and intermittently from 1959 through 1966 (Hart 1976 . Hart's magnum opus, The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan R i f (1976) , ranks among the finest ethnographies ever written about the Berber highlands of Morocco. It is precisely the excellence of Hart's data that makes it possible to demonstrate the inaccuracy of his analysis. ' Our critique of Hart's segmentary interpretation of the precolonial (pre-1926) Rif can be summarized as follows. Most levels of precolonial Rifian social structure lacked any genealogical definition, even in "ideal" or "ideological" terms. Arable land, the most valued productive resource in this sedentary agriculturalist society, was not controlled by lineages. It was a commodity bought and sold by individuals. Similarly, conflicts involved not lineages but individuals and factions. These individuals were very often brothers and the sons of brothers in com~etition for arable land-as well as for Dower and status. Opposing brothers and patrilateral cousins were supported by factions that cut across genealogical lines. In many cases, men even paid "strangers" to kill their close patrilateral kin (Hart 1976:329, 334-335) . The market councils that levied fines for murder were structured in terms of factional alliances and territory, not in terms of lineages, as Hart thought. The fines themselves were distributed primarily along factional rather than lineage lines. And the competition between the most powerful factions was directly linked to the role of the Moroccan state, which was more important than Hart realized.
The Segmentary Lineage Model
Paul Dresch has argued that lineage theory and segmentation should not be confused (1986:309) . And logically they certainly are distinct. At the core of the segmentary model is the idea that each segment is itself segmented and there is opposition between its parts. The members of any segment unite for war against adjacent segments of the same order and unite with these adjacent segments against larger sections. [ Evans-Pritchard 1940a : 1421 HENRYMu,\.~soN,JR. is Associate Professor, Anthropology Department, University of Maine, Orono, M E 04469. 386 The precolonial Rif was divided into territorial entities known as dhiqbaair (plural of dhaqbitsh). The Rifian Berber word dhaqbitsh is a cognate of the Arabic word qabila (Hart 1976:235, 456) . In the Moroccan context, both terms are usually translated as "tribe," although this is misleading in the sedentary agriculturalist highlands. Among pastoral nomads, a qabila is commonly understood to be a genealogically structured group in which the economic and political rights and duties of individuals are, to some degree, determined by their membership in corporate descent groups (Hart 1962 (Hart , 1987 Marx 1977) . But among the sedentary agriculturalist Rifis, the concept of dhaqbitsh has not had this meaning in the past century-and perhaps never did (Hart 1976:ll-13,239) . In the dhaqbitsh ofAith Waryaghar (see Figure 1) during the early 1950s, nobody knew the origin of the dhaqbitsh's name, which means "people of Waryaghar," although some suggested that it was related to the Rifian word awragh ("yellow") and the popular belief that there was gold in the Jbil Hmam massif (Hart 1976:239) . No one ever told Hart that there was an ancestor named Waryaghar from whom the Aith Waryaghar was descended. And there was no genealogy linking the various components of the dhaqbitsh in terms of such descent (see Table 1 ).
This lack of genealogical definition is characteristic of the qaba'il ("tribes") throughout the sedentary highlands of Morocco (Montagne 1930:36; Berque 1955:3-4, 226-227; Gellner 1969:39-40; Hart 1976: 11-12; Munson 1981 Munson , 1984 . It is also characteristic of many nomadic or formerly nomadic qaba'il (Berque 1974:22-34; Chiapuris 1979:38; Vinogradov 1974:55) . But some nomadic qaba'il did have traditions of common patrilineal ancestry that were socially and politically significant before colonial rule (Hart 1962518, 1984 (Hart 1962518, :42-56, 1987 . This was never the case among highland sedentary agriculturalists.
Just as the precolonial dhaqbitsh was territorially rather than genealogically defined, so too were the segments into which it was divided. The Rifian dhiqba'ir were divided into rbuC (sg. rba'), or "sections." Although rba' literally means "one-fourth" or "quarter," most dhiqba'ir were not divided into precisely four rbu'. Ibuqquyen had three, Timsaman had five, Axt Tuzin had five, Aith Waryaghar had eleven, while only Aith 'Ammarth had exactly four (Hart 1976:251) . (We shall see that the dhaqbitsh of Aith Waryaghar was divided into five "fifths," some of which included more than one rba'. The structure of these fifths will only be intelligible after we discuss factions and the distribution of fines.)
In The Aith Waryaghar ofthe Moroccan RiJ Hart translates rba' as "clan," or as "subclan" when referring to a smaller rbac within a larger one (1976:244-245, 463) . But this translation is inappropriate because the rba' was a territorial entity (often a valley and its contiguous slopes), the inhabitants ofwhich almost never had traditions ofcommon ancestry (Coon 1931 :91-93; Hart 1976:235) .
Within each rba' were a number of villages, which Hart prefers to refer to as "local communities" because of their dispersed settlement pattern (1976:263) . As a community of people, the village was referred to as a jma'th, or "assembly." (This term was also used to refer to the village councils composed of the adult males.) Like the rba', the jmacth was generally not identified with a specific descent group (Blanco Izaga 1975:108-109, 113, 133-134) . In other words, it was not "an aggregate of persons clustered around an agnatic nucleus" (Evans-Pritchard 1940a:203) .
The Dharjiqth (Which Hart Translates as "Lineage") Villages were usually inhabited by a number of genealogically unrelated dharjqin, many of them coming from different dhiqba'ir (Blanco Izaga 1975: 108-109, 133-1 34) . Each dharjqth inhabited a specific area in the village (1975: 132) . Hart defines the dharjqth as an "agnatic lineage," in which descent from a common ancestor from four to eight generations removed from living members could be demonstrated genealogically (1976:456) . But Roger and Terri Joseph contend that individuals recognized an identity with [a] specific dharJiqthbut were unable to trace any degree of relatedness to other members unless they were also members of an individual's three or four generational extended family. Woseph and Joseph 1987:29] Hart's own data show that dharJiqin were sometimes widely dispersed in different dhiqbaDir with their members having no clear idea as to their genealogical relationship (1976:267) . In other words, the dharJiqth could in some cases be viewed as a "clan" and in others as a "lineage." Table 1 Nomenclature of orecolonial Rifian societv. Dhaqbitsh (pl. dhiqba'ir) Translated as "tribe" by Hart Khums (pl. khmas) "Fifth" of a dhaqbitsh Rba ' (pl. rbu') "Quarter" or "section" of a dhaqbitsh Jmacth (pl.jma'ath) "Village" or "local community" Dharfiqth (pl. dharfiqin) Translated as "agnatic lineage" by Hart Liff(~l. & ! ! "Faction" Amghar (pl. imgharen) "Big man," councillor, factional leader
The members of a dharjqth referred to themselves as "people of my father's brother" (Aith 'Azizi or Aith 'Amumi in Berber, Ulad al-'Amm in Arabic) (Hart 1976207) . Being a member of a particular dharjqth was a salient feature of a person's identity, and its members in a particular village were usually buried in the same area (Hart 1976:263) . But the dharjqth was not a corporate group. That is to say that membership in it did not imply any specific economic or political rights and duties, except in the case of some patrilineal descendants of saints who derived economic and political benefits from the belief in their holiness (Hart 1976:97, We shall demonstrate the generally noncorporate nature of the dharjqth, first with respect to land tenure and then with respect to the Rifian vendetta.
Land and Corporateness
As might be expected in a sedentary plow agriculturalist society, arable land was the most highly valued natural resource in the precolonial Rif, as it is today (Hart 1976:38) . Although Hart often speaks of such land as if it were controlled by corporate lineages, it was in fact generally private property (mulk) bought and sold by individuals (Hart 1976:97; Jamous 1981:35) . In the Rif, as in the other sedentary agriculturalist highlands of Morocco, this was not a new phenomenon induced by Morocco's incorporation into "the world capitalist system" or by Spanish rule . It had existed for centuries (see Berque 1955:84, 168-169,36 1,363-367; Munson 1980:33) .
Hart unintentionally demonstrates this by means of his extremely valuable list of land titles from the 18th through the 20th centuries in an appendix of The Aith Waryaghar o f the Moroccan Rif (1976:507-510) . The first title concerns the "sale of pomegranate trees" in 1724; the second, dated 1736, involves a woman who sold some land to her brother (1976:507) . The latter sale demonstrates that siblings did not share access to land by virtue of belonging to a common lineage. The notion of a jurally significant lineage is completely absent from the bill of sale, as summarized by Hart. The woman had inherited the land from her father and was now selling it to her brother. She was not selling the usufruct to a parcel of land controlled by a descent group. She was selling the land itself, plus the trees on it. Already in the early 18th century (and probably long before that), the most valuable land in the Rif was a cash commodity bought and sold by individuals.
Hart gives many other examples of land sales, including some involving individuals from one dhaqbitsh ("tribe") buying land in another (1976:110, 242-243, 507-509) . I t is true that Hart sometimes speaks of "lineages" or "tribes" as being involved in these transactions, but he is in fact speaking of individuals. For example, in 1870 the Fqir Azzugwagh, born in the dhaqbitsh of Igzinnayen, bought some land in the adjacent dhaqbitsh of Aith Waryaghar for 30 mithqals-a mithqal being a unit of currency worth 29 grams of silver (Hart 1976:326; Brignon et al. 1967:309) .6 Azzugwagh bought this land jointly with a man of Aith Waryaghar to whom he was genealogically unrelated (Hart 1976:325) . In the text of his book, Hart speaks of this land as having been bought from "the lineages" of Ihammuthen and Yinn Hand w-'Abdallah (Hart 1976326) . But in his list of land titles, Hart notes that the land in question was bought from two individuals, not from dharjiqin; one of the individuals was a woman (Hart 1976:508 from the dhaqbitsh of Aith Waryaghar buying some olive trees "from the Igzinnayen" in 1829 (Hart 1976:507) . But in response to a question about this particular sale, Hart has conceded that the olive trees were sold by an individual from the dhaqbitsh of Igzinnayen (personal communication, 1979) . All the other sales referred to by Hart also involved individuals.
The only land in any way controlled by descent groups in the precolonial Rifwas some hbus, inalienable religious property, the revenue of which was sometimes distributed among the patrilineal descendants of a saint (Hart 1976:97,100) . These people were, and are, scattered in many different villages, dhiqba'ir, and towns. Such property, which only included an infinitesimal percentage of cultivable land, was usually donated to a mosque or to a saint's shrine by individuals (Hart 1976: 100) .
Most arable land of any value was privately owned mulk, which was inherited equally by sons, with daughters receiving halfa son's share (Hart 1976:97, 101 ): "It is commonly recognized that brothers often do not get along well together, and for this reason alone division is virtually automatic after the father dies" (1976:98) .7 Arable land was thus generally owned by individuals.
As for village communal land, the land of the jmacth, it was controlled by the village council ofadult males, not by a descent group (Hart 1976:99) . It will be recalled that the Rifian village typically contained a number of unrelated dharfiqin. Individual families, including some that had recently immigrated from other villages or "tribes," would be allowed to cultivate village communal land, which was usually hillside scrub forest used primarily for slash-and-burn cultivation, grazing, charcoalmaking, and gathering firewood (Hart 1976:99) .
In short, land in the precolonial Rif, since the 18th century at the very least, was not controlled by descent groups-with the marginal exception of a few holy dharfiqin that received a share of the crops or revenues from religious endowments. The existence of individually owned land bought and sold for cash in highlands conventionally referred to as "tribal" will undoubtedly surprise some. But the fact is that private property, mulk, has prevailed for centuries throughout the sedentary highlands of Morocco, alongside communal village land and the less important religious endowments (see Berque 1955:84, 168-169, 361, 363-367; Montagne 1930:248-249; Munson 1980:33, 198 1 :252) .
Violence and Corporateness
Just as the Rifian dharfiqth was not corporate in an economic sense, so too did it lack corporateness in a political sense. We have seen that rather than being controlled collectively by dharfiqin, land was inherited equally by sons, with a half share for daughters. This system of partible inheritance meant that sons and the sons of sons were in direct competition for the most valued resource in the sedentary agriculturalist Rif. As in the Pukhtun highlands of Pakistan, violence in the precolonial Rif typically evolved out of this competition between brothers and the sons of brothers (Ahmed 1980:27,94, 128,294; Barth 1965 Barth [1959 : 109-1 10; Hart 1985:53-58, 65-66, 80-85; Jamous 1981:133; Lindholm 1982:56, 65, 67 ; for comparable tensions without comparable violence, see Aswad 1971~32-33, 78-85, 114-115) .
Some of Hart's best ethnography involves the reconstruction of what he calls the precolonial Rifian "feud" (Hart 1970 (Hart , 1976 . But in anthropological usage, the notion of "feud" is usually associated with the existence of politically corporate descent groups collectively responsible for vengeance and compensation (Middleton and Tait 1958:19; Peters 1975:xii-xiv) . None of the Rifian conflicts described by Hart involved such groups (Hart 1976:308, 329-338) . We shall therefore refer to them as "vendettas" (Peters 1975:xiii-xiv) .
Hart's excellent reconstruction of what he calls "the Imjjat feud" illustrates the distinctive features of the Rifian vendetta (1976:325-338) . The people of the Imjjat dharfiqth could demonstrate common patrilineal descent from one Yusif u-Yahya (David Hart, personal communication, 1988) . No one knows why the dharjiqth is named Imjjat, which is a place name. The great-grandson ofYusif u-Yahya, according to the genealogy given Hart, was a man usually referred to as the Fqir Azzugwagh, or "redheaded member of a Sufi brotherhood," because he belonged to the Darqawa order. In the mid-19th century, the Fqir Azzugwagh fled from his village in the dhaqbitsh of Igzinnayen because he had murdered a man. He settled in the dhaqbitsh of Aith Waryaghar, in the mountainous southeastern rbaC of Aith Turirth, where he married a local woman with whom he had four sons, 'Amar, Mzzyan, Muh, and Muh the younger, as well as a daughter named Fadhma (Hart 1976:326) . With the help of his sons, the Fqir became one of the two most powerful men in the rba' of Aith Turirth, despite being an immigrant from another dhaqbitsh (Hart 1976:329) . The other strong man in the rbaC was al-Hajj M'awsh of the "autochthonous" dharfiqth of Yinn Hand w-'Abdallah (Hart 1976) . The Fqir and al-Hajj M'awsh led the dominant factions (liffs) of Aith Turirth in the late 19th century (1976:330) . The Fqir died in the first decade of the 20th century, after having divided his land equally among his four sons (1976:103) . (His daughter Fadhma died before he did.)
The Imjjat vendetta evolved out of the murder of the Fqir Azzugwagh's son Muh by a member of the Imjjat dharfiqth in the Fqir's natal village of Hibir in Igzinnayen (Hart 1976) . After Muh Azzugwagh's death, his brothers Mzzyan and 'Amar killed his murderer-their agnate. Then Mzzyan married his dead brother's widow and thus became the stepfather of her daughter Fattush. Mzzyan's brother 'Amar wanted this girl to marry his son so as to get de facto control of the land she had inherited from her father. But Mzzyan arranged for her to marry a friend of his and retained de facto control of her land for himself (1976:330) . Soon the sons and grandsons ofthe Fqir Azzugwagh were divided into two factions: that of Mzzyan Azzugwagh and that of his brother 'Amar.
These two opposing factions (whose core members belonged to the same dharfiqth) replaced those of al-Hajj M'awsh and the Fqir Azzugwagh as the two dominant factions in the rba' of Aith Turirth, with al-Hajj M'awsh now supporting Mzzyan Azzugwagh (1976:332) . Some members of al-Hajj Mcawsh's dharfiqth, however, belonged to the faction led by 'Amar Azzugwagh (1976:272, 332) . Virtually all the men in Aith Turirth, as well as many in the neighboring rba' of Timarzga and the dhaqbitsh of Igzinnayen, were allied to one faction or the other (1976:332) . "Tribal" and rba' boundaries, like "agnatic solidarity," did not constrain conflict in the precolonial Rif.
Although many men outside the Imjjat dharfiqth eventually joined one of the two factions led by the two brothers Mzzyan and 'Amar, the vendetta remained primarily a family affair with the principal murders involving the sons and grandsons of the Fqir Azzugwagh-both as killer and as victim (Hart 1976:329-337) . 'Amar Azzugwagh himself was killed by his brother Mzzyan, who was in turn killed by 'Amar's son Muh n-'Amar (1976:334) .
The precolonial Rif inverted the conventional wisdom that, in the tribal regions of the Islamic world, marriage occurred within the "lineage" and murder without. Marriage within the dharfiqth was in fact rare whereas murder within it was commonplace. Of 42 marriages involving members of the Imjjat dharfiqth, only three were with other members of the dharJiqth (Hart 1976:327) . But the great majority ofmurders in the Imjjat vendetta involved members of the dharjiqth killing other members of this group-with the other victims usually being affines and/or matrilateral relatives (1976:329-337; Munson 1982:485) . Being kin did not mean being kind.
One might suggest that the Azzugwaghs were perhaps a slightly unusual family and that one cannot make generalizations about the corporateness of the Rifian dharjiqth on the basis of the Imjjat vendetta alone. However, of the four other vendettas Hart describes in The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan RiJ; all involved the murder of brothers, of brothers' sons, of fathers' brothers, or of sons of fathers' brothers (1976:324-325) . Hart provides further evidence of such intrafamilial vendettas-usually precipitated by conflicts over land-in his forthcoming The Aith Waryaghar and their Rifian Neighbors (1990) . Munson] PRECOLONIAL RIF MOROCCAN 393 Jamous also emphasizes the importance of such conflicts among close agnates in the eastern Rif (1981:128-134) .
"Big Men"
Hart correctly emphasizes the importance of the precolonial councils that met at weekly markets (1976:283-303) . These councils were composed of factional leaders called imgharen, or "big men" somewhat reminiscent of their Melanesian counterparts (Sahlins 1968:88-90) . Literally, amghar means "full-grown adult male," from the Berber root meaning "to grow, to grow old, to be big" (Hart 1976:283,452) . Imgharen would start accumulating power in their local village council, which was composed of all adult males. Then the more powerful would move up to the weekly market council. And the very powerful would belong to the council of their dhaqbitsh as a whole, although such "tribal" councils appear to have been rarely convened ( 1976:287) .
The principle of recruitment was based upon what Erola aptly terms "la ley del masfuerte": the stronger an amghar, the quicker he rose to the highest representational level, and his strength was measured in terms of (1) his own physical courage; (2) the number of his agnates, ltf[faction] allies, affines, and other constituents, and the number of guns they could command; and (3) his wealth and personal resources. Once in office, the tenure of an amghar was theoretically for life, but more often than not his life was cut short by a bullet, or a dagger, or a billhook, or even by poison in his tea: the competition for political office was extremely fierce and of a markedly "dogeat-dog" character. A weak amghar was a no-good amghar and he never rose above the level of the local community. [Hart 1976:284] Needless to say, having a large number of agnates was not terribly useful if many of them were in a hostile faction (lzfl-as was typically the case. The imgharen were heads ofjoint or extended families and, when they were really powerful, offactions that included genealogically unrelated allies (1976:335-337 ). They were not heads of lineages.
Councils, Factions, and Fines
The weekly market councils imposed fines upon murderers (Blanco Izaga 1975:305) . Each council had a written legal code (qanun) specifying the amounts of these fines, depending on whether or not the murder was committed at a market or on a market day. These codes demonstrate the importance of collective punishment by the representatives of "the body politic," even though they did not eliminate the vendetta. They also illustrate the absence of politically corporate lineages. A murderer's dharjiqth was not collectively responsible for vengeance or compensation in the case of murder (Hart 1976:308, 337) . HO&could it have been in a society where murder typically involved brothers and the sons of brothers in conflict over land? (See Schemer 1986:344-345 .) The dharfiath of 
A ,
Hart contends that the distribution of the fines for murder among the im~haren of the " w weekly market councils reflected "the segmentary system," or "more accurately, perhaps, it was a faithful reflection of the inherent compromise between the segmentary and the territorial systems" (1976:295) . But there was no segmentary system to compromise. What Hart perceived as a system of lineages was in fact a network of factions. The market councils, which Hart calls "clan councils," were usually named after the rbac (or "quarter") where they were located. But they were in fact governed by genealogically unrelated imgharen from different but adjacent rbuC and often even from different but adjacent dhiqbaair (Hart 1976:283, 300-303) . For example, the fines collected by the council of the Wednesday Market of Aith Turirth (in the southeastern corner of the dhaqbitsh of Aith Waryaghar) were divided among genealogically unrelated imgharen from three adjacent rbuC of the dhaqbitsh of Aith Waryaghar and an adjacent rbaC of the dhaqbitsh of Axt Tuzin, just east of Aith Waryaghar (Hart 1976:301-302) . At the older Sunday Market of Izimmuren, also in the Aith Waryaghar rba' of Aith Turirth, imgharen from two rbu' of the dhaqbitsh of Igzinnayen (southeast ofAith W a r~a g h a r ) participated in the market council alongside genealogically unrelated imgharen from adjacent rbu' of the dhaqbitsh of Aith Waryaghar (Hart 1976:302) . It will be recalled that Hart, like everyone else, translates dhaqbitsh as "tribe." But one is struck by the apparent irrelevance of "tribal" boundaries in the composition of the market councils that were a major, if not the major, institution of local government in the precolonial Rif.
One is also struck by the irrelevance of genealogical segmentation in the composition of the market councils and in the distribution of the revenue from the fines they imposed. Early in the 20th century, at the Wednesday Market of Aith Turirth, equal shares of fine revenue went to the genealogically unrelated councillors (imgharen) who led the two dominant factions in the rba' of Aith Turirth: al-Hajj MCawsh and the Fqir Azzugwagh, the latter being an immigrant to the dhaqbitsh of Aith Waryaghar from the nearby dhaqbitsh of Igzinnayen. (As has already been noted, the factions of M'awsh and Azzugwagh eventually merged with those led by the Fqir Azzugwagh's two sons Mzzyan and 'Amar.) A similar division of fines along factional rather than lineage lines occurred at the Sunday Market of Izimmuren (1976:302) . We shall now demonstrate that this appears to have been the general rule.
In addition to the weekly market councils, there were infrequently convened councils ofthe imgharen from an entire dhaqbitsh (1976:303) . The only example Hart gives ofa meeting of the council of the dhaqbitsh of Aith Waryaghar is when the imgharen of this dhaqbitsh met in 1908 to swear loyalty to the Moroccan sultan Mulay Hafid, whose rule was being threatened by the revolt of Bu Hmara (1976:365) .
Hart contends that the fines collected by the dhaqbitsh council of Aith Waryaghar were distributed among the five "fifths" (khmas) into which the dhaqbitsh was divided (1976:313) : I, the primarily northern rbuC of Aith Yusif w-'Ari and Aith 'Ari and the southern rbuC of Aith Turirth, and Timarzga; 11, the western rbac of Aith 'Abdallah; 111, the eastern rbuC of Aith Bu 'Ayyash and Aith 'Adhiya; IV, the southwestern rba' of Aith Hadhifa and the southeastern one of Aith 'Arus, plus the northeastern village-cum-rba' of Icakkiyen; and V, the northern central rba' of Imrabdhen (Hart 1976:297-298) .
Hart did come across a few origin traditions for the five fifths of the Aith Waryaghar, but except for the holy fifth-cum-rbac of the Imrabdhen, these had no relationship to the internal structure of the fifths or to the distribution of fines in them (1976:239-241) . As in the case of the distribution of the fines at the weekly market councils, descent had nothing to do with the distribution of the fines among the five genealogically unrelated fifths of Aith Waryaghar. For example, in the rba' of Aith 'Adhiya in fifth 111, we find the amghar of the holy dharjiqth ofAith Bu Qiyadhen, which claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad through a local saint, receiving shares alongside "lay" imgharen whose dharjqin came from the Ghmara region west of the Rif and others claiming to be descended from the Marinid dynasty (al-Bu ' Ayyashi 1974:237-242; Hart 1976:254, 502) .
But while the distribution of the dhaqbitsh council fines was not genealogically determined, nor was it simply a reflection of territorial boundaries either. Fifth I11 was composed of the adjacent eastern rbu' of Aith Bu-'Ayyash and Aith 'Adhiya, each of which received half of the fines allotted to the fifth as a whole (Hart 1976:502-503) . The Aith 'Adhiya share was divided four ways, with one fourth going to the village of Aith Tazurakhth (see Figure l ) , all the genealogically unrelated dharjqin ofwhich had originated in other dhiqbaDir (Hart 1976:502-503; Blanco Izaga 1975:175) . Out of the share going to this village, one-fifth was handed over to what Hart refers to as the "lineage" of Aith Bu Stta in the village of Aith Bu Khrif in the adjacent rbaC of Aith Bu CAyyash-because oflzff ajiliation (Hart 1976:298) .
Hart, following Blanco Izaga, has drawn his map of the five fifths of the Aith Waryaghar (upon which Figure 1 is based) largely along the lines of fine distribution, which was in fact based on lzffalliances as well as territory. This, and not "lineage scission and re-PRECOLONIAL RIF MOROCCAN duplication," accounts for the apparent territorial discontinuity of some rbuc and fifths in Aith Waryaghar, the biggest dhaqbitsh in the Rif (1976:267) . We have seen that what Hart calls a "lineage" in the village of Aith Bu Khrif in the rbaC of Aith Bu 'Ayyash received a share of the fine allotted to the adjacent rbaC of Aith 'Adhiya (at the eastern edge of Aith Waryaghar) because of lzff affiliation. But another seven "lineages" in this same village received one-fourth of the dhaqbitsh council fines allotted to the rbac of Aith Bu ash ash (1976:502) . In other words, the villagers of Aith Bu Khrif were divided into two lzfi and lzffmembership was the crucial determinant of fine distribution. The "lineages" to which Hart alludes were actually individual men and their households and lzj-allies. Fighting very often involved adjacent households shooting at each other, and the men in these adjacent houses usually belonged to the same dharjqth (1976:263, 314) .
The central role of lzffaffiliation in fine distribution is corroborated by further evidence from the village ofAith Tazurakhth at the eastern edge of the eastern rbaC ofAith 'Adhiya. As already noted, this village received one-fourth of the fine allotted to the rbac of Aith 'Adhiya, one-fifth of which went to the Aith Bu Stta "lineage" in the village of Aith Bu Khrif in the adjacent rbaC of Aith Bu 'Ayyash because of lzffaffiliation (Hart 1976:298) . The remaining four-fifths allotted to the village of Aith Tazurakhth were distributed as follows: two-thirds went to "5 !h lineages" of the Aith 'Aisa "lineage-group" and onethird went to "4 '/2 lineages" of the Aith Luqman "lineage group" (1976:254, 502) . The explanation of this split into five-and-a-half and four-and-a-half lineages is that one "lineage" in the village of Aith Tazurakhth "was itself split in half in its own immediate liff alignments" (1976:503) .
Lzfi were usually named after the dharjqth of their leaders-a figure of speech that was perhaps partially responsible for Hart's confusion of 1zfi and lineages. Thus the lzffof Amar Azzugwagh was known as "the Imjjat lzA" even though it did not include everyone in the dharjqth of Imjjat and did include genealogically unrelated allies (Hart 1976:302, 333 ). So we can surmise that what Hart refers to as the "lineage groups" of Aith 'Aisa and Aith Luqman in the village of Aith Tazurakhth were actually lzfi named after the dharjqths of their imgharen. Lzfi rather than lineages were clearly the central political units of local conflict in precolonial Rifian society.
In addition to what he views as "lower-level" lzfi, Hart contends that there were also "upper-level" 1zfi that linked rbuc (1976:313-314) . (The lzfi we have discussed thus far linked individuals and their households in several rbuc.) If this hypothesis of two separate levels offactions were correct, then one might be tempted to speak ofa segmentary system of balanced lzfi rather than lineages, with lower-level factions fusing into upper-level ones in the face of external threat. But, to begin with, Hart repeatedly demonstrates that opposing lzfi were not usually balanced: one was typically larger and stronger than the other (1976:254, 316-317, 322, 333, 358, 502-503) . And "lower-level" lzfi did not generally fuse in the face of external foes. When Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Karim led the Rifians in their war against the Spanish (1921-26) , he often had to appoint two officials to be in charge of a particular rbaC because the imgharen who led the lzfi in the rba' would not unite even in the context of their holy war against Spanish colonialism (Hart 1976:384-385) .' Hart does not give any examples of "lower-level" lzfi focusing to become "upper-level" ones.
It would appear then that what Hart referred to as "upper-level" lzfi linking rbu' were simply dominant lzfi linking men and households in various rbu'. For example, what might appear to have been an "upper-level" lzffalliance between the southern Aith Waryaghar rba' of Timarzga and the northern Igzinnayen rba' of Asht 'Asim (Hart 1976:303) was in fact simply a lzffalliance between the dominant amghar ofTimarzga, Shaykh 'Amar nj-Muqaddim, and the dominant amghar of Asht 'Asim, al-Hajj Biqqish (1976:335-336, 358, 398) . Other men in both of these rbu' remained in 1zfi consistently opposed to these two powerful imgharen (1976:398) . Thus, just as we cannot speak of "lower-level" lzffalliances between lineages, so too we cannot speak of "upper-level" lzflalliances between rbuc. Indeed, it would seem that we cannot speak of two levels at all, only of 1zfi that tended to dominate particular rbuc, in part because of lzffallies from other rbuc.
Factional Leaders and the Moroccan State
Imgharen tended to ally themselves with men with whom they were not in direct competition. Thus we find that the dominant imgharen in adjacent rbuc subject to the same official representative of the Moroccan sultan were usually in opposite lzfi, while the dominant imgharen in adjacent rbuc not subject to the same official were laflallies (Hart 1976:316, 356-359) . This was probably because the imgharen in the same dhaqbitsh were competitors vying to be the sultan's representative and tax collector, whereas imgharen of adjacent rbuC not in the same dhaqbitsh were not. Hart's data demonstrate that it was only in relation to the Moroccan state that the dhaqbitsh was a politically cohesive unit (1976:358, 365) .
Hart contends that in the 19th century the central Rifian highlands, including the Aith Waryaghar, were independent of the Moroccan sultanate, or makhzen (1976:351) . But he provides a massive amount of historical evidence indicating otherwise (1976:349-368) . Further evidence of the subordination of the precolonial Rif to the Moroccan state can be found in many historical sources (al-Zayyani 1969[1886]:77-78,99, 103, 105 in Arabic text, and 183-184, 190, 194-195 in French translation; Ayache 1979:199-227; al-Bu 'Ayyashi 1974:237-242; al-Ducayyif 1986 al-Ducayyif [1818 :46, 345). This is not to suggest that the sultan controlled local affairs in the precolonial Rif on a regular basis. But the sultan's officials in the Rif were able to collect taxes, even though they sometimes needed the sultan's troops to help them do so (Hart 1976:35 1; al-Ducayyif 1986 al-Ducayyif [1818 .
Being an official representative of the sultan in the Rif was a lucrative position in that the state structure was based on "tax farming." Powerful local leaders would pay for governmental positions because they would then be entitled to a share of the taxes they collected as well as to enhanced status and power (Rezzouk 1905:268; Forbes 1924: 101) . For these reasons, the dominant imgharen competed to be the official representative (and tax collector) of the sultan. And dominant imgharen in adjacent rbuC of the same dhaqbitsh were generally hostile to each other while being allied to dominant imgharen of adjacent rbuc in neighboring dhiqba'ir (see Hart 1976:316, 358-359) . This is reminiscent of how men would ally themselves with non-kin against brothers and the sons of their father's brothers. Social proximity led to enmity and social distance to amity.
Conclusion
Hart's meticulously detailed data make clear that what he imagined to be a segmentary lineage system was in fact a network of lzflalliances. In the precolonial Rif, the scale of segmentary sociability was inverted. Hostility was not directed outward toward strangers, but inward toward close kin with whom one was in direct competition for land. In many cases, people even hired "strangers" to kill their patrilateral kin (Hart 1976:329, 334-335) .
Some might want to argue that no matter how unsegmentary Rifian behavior actually was, there was nonetheless a "norm" or "folk model" of segmentary sociability, as embodied in the verse, "Even if we fight among ourselves, we unite for war outside" (Hart 1976: 168) . But ifany society having such ideals is segmentary, then there are no societies that are not. Moreover, such a diluted notion of segmentation is quite far removed from the segmentary lineage model that anthropologists like Hart have in mind when they use the term "segmentary." The latter model was not that of the precolonial Rifians.
In short, the segmentary lineage model is irrelevant insofar as precolonial Rifian social structure is concerned. .
Transliteration. I have followed Hart's transliteration of Rifian Berber (see Hart 1976:xxi) . In transliterating Arabic words, I follow the;tandard system used by the International Journal $Middle East Studies, minus diacritics. The is the u p , a pharyngeal fricative produced by pressing the root of the tongue against the back of the throat. The ' is the hamza, a glottal stop.
'For present purposes, I do not discuss the debate over the applicability of the segmentary model to the precolonial societies of the Nuer, the Tallensi, and the Tiv (see Holy 1979) .
2After reading several earlier versions of this article, Hart has acknowledged the inapplicability of the segmentary lineage model in the Rif and will take a new position in his forthcoming book, The Aith Waryaghar and their RiJian Neighbors (1990) . Thus, statements such as "Hart contends" should actually be in the past tense. But since Hart revised his earlier view of the Rif in response to this article, and since his revised view remains relatively unknown, the "ethnographic present" has been retained. 3Although my reinterpretation of Hart's segmentary analysis of the Rif may appear to mesh with the interpretivist view that Moroccan society is best seen as revolving around the "dyadic relations" between individuals, I would argue that such relations are structurally circumscribed to a far greater degree than the interpretivist literature would suggest. For two quite different critiques of the individualistic bias in Geertzian studies of Moroccan society and culture, see Dresch (1986) and Munson (1986) .
4Raymond Jamous, in his very interesting book on the eastern Rif (1981) , also fails to examine the relations hi^ between data and analvsis in Hart's work and acceDts Hart's characterization of the Rif as "segmentary" without providing any data of his own that would justify this label (see Munson 1982) .
5Some of the principal conceptions of "corporateness" are discussed in Fortes 1969:292-308. 6Wilfrid Rollman notes that the actual mithqal coin was no longer used in 1870, although it was still used as a "money of account" (personal communication, 1988) . See Ayache (1979:130) .
'Hart incorrectly injects the notion of "lineage" into his discussion of shufCa,or "pre-emption" (1976:102) . In Islamic law, the right of shufca (shufcath in Rifian Berber) concerns co-owners of property regardless of the relationship between them (Hanoteau and Letourneux 1893:11:401) . Such coowners had priority rights with respect to the purchase of land being sold by a fellow co-owner. 81n 1977, I asked the late Rifi historian al-Hajj Ahmad al-Bu <Ayyashi how long privately owned land had existed in the Rif. He said, "Since the Islamic conquest," that is, since the early 8th century. He could be right. It is certainly true that in some regions of Morocco various forms of land tenure were transformed into private property in the late 19th century (Lazarev 1966) . But it would be a serious mistake to intepret the evolution of all private property in the sedentary highlands in this way. Berque cites land sales among the Seksawa of the High Atlas from the 16th and 17th centuries (1955:84. 3631 . I h o~e to locate deeds describine land sales in earlier centuries.
